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EVALUATING UKRAINIAN
POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT:

A Case Study of Ukrainian
Elections 1994-2002
Clifford Blair
ABSTRACT

Perhaps the key problon observed in the deIJelopment of Ukrainian democracy, as it relates to the
party ~vstem, is thefractionalization and non consolidation ofpolitical parties. This research willfill
all existing need ~y generating more complete ellidence of the weakness ofinstitutional approaches to
this problem ill Fastern Europe. It will also prolJide substantiation for future broad consideratioll of
elite-motiuator explanations in other post-socialist countries. Traditionally, the favored approach in
studies of par~y systems has been heavily biased towards institutional explanations. Recent studies,
however, haw shown this paradigm to be unsatisfoctory when applied to post-socialist states in Fastern
Eitrope and particularly to the former US.S.R., but thusfor with a very limited number of cases.
These studies htllJC also tended to rely 011 cultural explanations in the absence of institutional theories,
but without good discussion of what culture can and cannot explain. Tn contrast, the role of elites has
receilled almost no consideration. Scholars that haul' discussed relelJant elite behalJior halle not made a
case linking these elite actions to the party ~ystem's failure to consolidate. This essay attempts to augment
criticisms of the institutional approach by demonstrating the inadequacy ofthis approach in Ukraine,
using added data about two Ukrainian parliamentary elections under different institutional
arrangements. It then makes an argument that an elite-moti/'ator paradigm provides a better
explanation of the /ili/ure of Ukrainian parties to consolidate. This is based on the behavior of
political elites in three of the most recent elections: the 1999 presidential election and the 1998 and
2002 parliamentary elections. The research shows that institutional changes in the Ukrainian parliamentary t,lection procedure failed to improlJe the ~ystem and also findr evidence that the political elite
rationally perpetuate many of the problems to their own aduantage.

I

n 1996 Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy
Carter, wrote about what he considered the "three major geopolitical events of the
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twenrieth century." They were, first, the tall of European empires after World War I; second,
the developmenr of the Iron Curtain-predicted by Winston Churchill-after World War
II; and third, the emergence of an independenr Ukrainian state after the Cold War (1996,
3-8). The next year Brzezinski offered further explanation for this surprising statement. He
described Ukraine as one of five "pivots" that geographically define the balance of power
in Eurasia-"the chessboard on which the struggle for global primae}' continues ro be
played" (1997, 31-47). Just this year in high-level meetings, Ukrainian and European
leaders broached the idea of Ukraine joining the European Union in the next ten ro twenry
years.] With its possible membership in the European Union and acceptance by the global
communiry of nations at stake, the international significance of democratic consolidation
in Ukraine should not be underestimated. This is particularly true in light of the f.1.ct that
it is uncertain whether the former Soviet republic will complete its evolution ro democracy
in the way that Western nations envisioned twelve years ago when the Soviet Union collapsed. Ukraine is an importanr case study not only for these reasons, but also because it
offers the opportunity to develop hypotheses about democratic consolidation that can be
applied in other post-socialist countries.
THE ROLE OF PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

Although the role of mature parties is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause for democratic
consolidation, without "well-organized and programmatically coherent political parties ...
it may prove more difficult to form an effective government" (Schmitter and Karl 1991,84).
More specifically, a significant aspect of the development of a parry system requires that all
of the major parties agree to work within the constitutional framework established by a
developing democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996b, 15-16). This includes a general agreement
among parties about the general policy direction of the country so that changes in the
governing parry do not equate to radical transformation of basic policies key to continued
democratic consolidation.
Since economic reform often occurs simultaneously with political reform, especially in
post-socialist countries like the European eastern bloc, political reform includes a general
consensus on economic restructuring. Diamond writes, "The consolidation of democracyso intimately linked to structural economic reform-requires the negotiation of some kind
of agreement or 'pact' among competing political parries and social forces on: (1) the
broad direction and principles of structural economic reform, which all parties suppOrt,
no matter which one(s) come to power" (1990, 113). As Andrew Wilson, perhaps the
preeminent scholar of independent Ukraine, and Arthur Bilous wrote in their very early
study of Ukrainian political parties:
Ukraine appears to have an anarchic and ineffective part)' system. A large number of
small, ill organised and fractious political parries seemingl)' promote instabiliry rather
than stabiliry, and hinder rather than help the tasks of building a stable civil society
and market economy.... The fear must be that if such parties cannot exercise much
influence on the development of society, they are helping to create a political vacuum
that may well be fIlled by some kind of revived authoritarianism. (1993,693)
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In this essay the definition of "party nonconsolidation" takes in many of the negative
characteristics described above, while "party consolidation" denotes the presence of their
positive alternatives. For example, longevity is an important attribute of parties in a consolidated party system: these parties are generally affected only in a limited way by changes in
leadership and are able to endure changes in government and society. Parties in a consolidated system develop coherent party programs or platforms that are usually practical and
devote effort to enacting these programs. Such parties regularly compete in elections
with the goal of controlling government in order to be able to do so.
Linz and Stepan have further written about the role of political parties in civil society.
"A consolidated democracy requires that a range of political parties not only represent
interests but seek by coherent programs and organizational activities to aggregate interests"
(1996a, 274). This is particularly true of post-socialist countries-like Ukraine-that in most
cases were totalitarian states. Because of the lack of civil society and a legacy of totalitarianism,
the development of parties to buttress nascent civil society makes party systems in such
states an even more important question than in states that do not suffer from the heritage
of totalitarianism.
While this is not to suggest that development of the party system is the only factor
affecting democratic consolidation, nor the most important, this research is particularly
significant because it will help us to better understand the chances for continued democratic
consolidation in post-socialist countries and also give greater insight into the party aspect of
political restructuring that must occur during democratic transitions. In conjunction with
other case studies from Eastern Europe, this study of Ukraine will lead to increased understanding of the situation in that region in both practical and theoretical terms.
THE WEAK SYSTEM: A BRIEF loOK AT THE PROBLEMS
WITH UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

A brief background about the situation of the party system in Ukraine will provide a clearer
understanding of some of the significant challenges that are faced in the democratic
consolidation process. Throughout Europe in the early 1990s, center and center-left parties
enjoyed electoral success throughout Europe, exemplified by Tony Blair and his "third
way." In Ukraine, centrist parties have also been politically successful in the decade since
independence; however, Andrew Wilson described the Ukrainian political center as a
"black hole" and'a "quagmire" (2002b, 172). These comments are typical of analyses of
the situation by other scholars cited in this essay, which include the following quotations
of Ukrainian observers and politicians:
The various centrist factions ... "CUI only be distinguished by their amorphousness
and an absence of direction in terms of their political and economic orientation. For
this reason, this agglomerate of forces can sooner be described as a gray void than as a
political center.... " Rukh chairman Viacheslav Chornovil described these centrist
factions as a "parliamentary sludge." "Sometimes they side with the leftists and sometimes with the rightists. They represent what might be called a situational majority,
which, unfortunately, does not want to be constructive, and which, in the event of any
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weakening, disappears .... " Within the amorphous ceorer (often termed the "bolota,"
or "swamp") cenain imerest groups exist (clan, regional, economic, and so on). These
centrists, or "pragmatists," as they prefer to be described, "often act not only independently of, but also coorrary to decisions by, the individual factions to which these
deputies formally belong .... '" This amorphousness weakened party and factional
unity in Ukraine and increased the opportunity for splinter groups to form. (D'Anieri,
Kravchuk, and Kuzio 1999, 160)

The illegitimacy of the left and the natural limitations of the right have produced an
ersatz center that is synthetically strong, but in reality fractionalized and not consolidated.
The illegitimacy of the left is perpetuated both by the more apolitical.ceorer and by the
obstructionism of the left itself. The natural limits of the right are exacerbated by abuse
of political power, also by the apolitical center, to ensure their continued nonviability as
major political players (see Table 1). As Wilson writes, this "opaque ceorrist 'non-party'
nature of Ukrainian government has produced a similar recipe [to the one party rule in
Italy or Japan) for stagnation, corruption and the growing abusc of the pOWl'r of the state"
(2002a, 173).

Table 1: The Spectrum of Ukrainian Political Parties
Political Spectrum Left

Center

Right

Main Parties

Communist Party (CPU)
(Symonenko); Socialist
Party (Moroz)

Our Ukraine (Yuschenko); Rukh factions now part of
()ur Ukraine and United
United Ukraine
(Kuchma'); SDP(U)
Ukraine
Medvedchyuk)'

Problems/
Weaknesses

Unrefi)rmed;
seen as illegitimate. not
potential partners in
governlnenr

Incoherent, lack of p.uty
platfclrIns; personalitvbased

Nationalist agenda wirh
limited regional appeal; old
plattlmll essentially fiilly
implemented

2002
Parliamentary
Election Results
(PR seats/SMD
seats) ,

79/9

1461120

tiL "

As in Russia, political parties in Ukraine have not yet reached developmental maturitythey are temporary phenomena, often founded solely on the popularity of their leader and
thus severely limited in their longevity, if not also in t111'ir platform and appeal. This is
especially true of the political center, whereas the right-of-center parties are the best
organized and the left-of-center panies the strongest e1ectorally in Ukraine. Thus far, the
centrist panies have not been forced to develop a coherent platform (other than to be
nominally "reformist") nor engage in serious competition in order to retain control of the
government.
The observation that the leftist parties are "illegitimate" can be explained as follows:
Although parties of the left poll up to 40 percent of voters, unlike French Socialists, British
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Labourites of old, or reformed Communists in Poland, Ukrainian Socialists and Communists
are "not regarded as safe custodianls] of state power" (172-73). This has meant that no leftof-center party is an actual competitor for government. That even the leftists recognize
their ineffectiveness is demonstrated by what Wilson describes as the genuine surprise of
Communist leader Petro Symonenko when President Leonid Kuchma suggested appointing
a leftist prime minister (2002b, 193).
Part of the reason for the left's continued illegitimacy is its own obstructionism. As
Wilson notes, "Nonconstructive opposition to the government in Kiev is actually a position
of considerable psychological comfort to the Communists" (2002b, 193). He observes,
"The Ukrainian Communists are even more unreformed than their Russian counterparts ...
[and the party] also remains one of the most left-wing parties in the post-Soviet world"
(189-90). One of their most destructive influences has been opposition to economic
reforms. The parliament elected in 1998, with a Communist plurality but not majority,
was particularly obtrusive. In January of 1999 a bid to abolish the presidency failed by only
t\vo votes. "This was a distinctly anti-presidential and anti-governmental Parliament ...
[and] it continued to be a distincdy ornery Parliament" (Harasymiw 2002, 291)." Changing
this situation will require more than just systemic reform or the effect of time on democratic consolidation it will also require inrernal transformation by the parties themselves.
Whereas a Communist electoral victory was certainly not a complete impossibility in
1999 or earlier, the right is natllrally limited in its electoral appeal by its nationalist program.
"The permanent government of the corporate centre is paradoxically the result both of the
[electoral] weakness of the right and the [electoral] strength of the left" (Harasymiw 2002,
173). The political event that has perhaps most shaped independent Ukraine was the socalled "Grand Bargain" bet\Veen the Rukh nationalists and the National Communist
defectors under former president Kravchuk. The Grand Bargain came about namely because
of the weakness of the nationalists. "The Ukrainian nationalists, uncomfortably aware of
their own minority status, have supported non-party, supposedly 'centrist' corporate government from the outside (with a few key ministries for themselves), so long as it has been
sufficiently 'Ukrainian'" (Harasymiw 2002, 173).
Two major problems with the right's nationalist platform limit the electoral strength of
the right-wing parties. First, their Ukrainian nationalist ptogram is highly regionalized:
"voters in Galicia and parts of central Ukraine will back it come what may ... [bur] this
guaranteed support represents a maximum of only 20-25% of the electorate" (172). In
addition, the nationalist movements are not just unpopular east of central Ukraine, but the
southeastern oblasts might very likely refuse even to accept any nationalist government.
"The very stability of the state would be threatened if the national question were to be
reopened" (206). Just as Wilson predicts that "Ukraine would split and one half would
fight" (2002b, 316) if reintegration with Russia was attempted, the same would occur if
the more extreme elements among the nationalists came to power.
The second problem is that the nationalist platform has essentially run out its logical
course. The first t\Vo presidents of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma and Leonid
Kravchuk, enacted 1110st of the official projects that the nationalists set out to undertake in
the area of nation building. The right "has begun to lose momentum, as its political agenda
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has seemingly been implemented by centrist proxy" (174). The only remaining nationalist
agenda is necessarily extreme and would most likely lead to severe crises like those previously
discussed. As Wilson wrote early on, "The right was never able to build any momentum.
Despite the hope constantly expressed that it could expand in the key target area of central
Ukraine and build on pockets of support in the east and south, the results of parliamentary
elections in J 994 and J 998 showed that it could not, with support for the national democrats ... even falling in some places" (I79). Without new and innovative platforms, the
right will continue to decline in electoral strength and will be more and more subject ro
the whims of the messy center. In other words, at present the prospects for rapid party
consolidation are not promising.
PARTY THEORY IN THE POST-SOCIALIST WORLD: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In analyzing the development of party systems in Ukraine and elsewhere, traditionally, an
institutional approach has held sway in the field of comparative politics. Recent research,
however, has shown that such an approach has only limited applicability to the problems
of party consolidation and institutionalization in newly democratizing countries of Southern
and Eastern Europe. The nonconsolidation of the party system in the face of institutional
reforms, however, makes these arguments unconvincing explanations for why parties in
Ukraine have not coalesced. In place of these institutional explanations, however, most
comparative political scientists have relied on cultural explanations while ignoring the elitemotivator approach. While there is certainly a place for culrural factors in studies of party
consolidation and institutionalization, and evidence to support such explanations, these
approaches have generally succumbed to some of the problems typical of cultural methodologies (Ross 1997, 60-67). Particularly noticeable is the lack of consideration of elitemotivator factors. This research will support recent conclusions about the institutional
approach, specifically in relation to Ukraine and then, in its place, provide arguments in
favor of an elite-motivator method of explaining party consolidation (or the lack thereof)
in Ukraine.
One of the earliest and still most respected works on party systems is Maurice
Duverger's Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (J 963).
Other significant works that have continued the institutional program include William
Riker's chapter on Duverger's law in Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences
(Grofman and Lijphard 1986) and Giovanni Sartori's work, including Parties and Party
Systems (1976). These authors focus on institutional constraints on party activity. They assign
particular importance to electoral law and the institutions of representation in legislative
systems. Applications of the institutional paradigm to post-Socialist cases in Eastern Europe
and former Soviet Union have shown it to be an ineffective explanation tor the unsuccessful
development of strong party systems in those countries. For example, in the context of the
former Soviet Union, the general expectation is that the introduction of a proportional
representation system will lead to a reduction in the number of parties, rather than an
Illcrease.
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Several studies have applied the institutional approach specifically in research on
Ukrainian politics. These include D'Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio's Politics and Society
in [Jlm/ine (1999), in which the authors provide cultural as well as institutional explanations
for the weakness of the party system in Ukraine (150). They also note the effect of regionalism (153), which Douglas Rae studied generally in an institutional context in Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (1971). D'Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio's conclusions, however,
focus exclusively on institutional elements; and thus their study misses important implications
of elite actions, which will be shown below (1999, 163). Sarah Birch-a specialist on
Ukrainian elections, takes a similar approach in her study of changes in electoral law
in Ukraine, under the assumption that such laws are the primary explanatory variable of
party system operation (Birch et al. 2002). In a chapter in Contemporary Ukraine (Kuzio
1998), Birch attempts to discount rationality as an independent variable by showing that
voter choice is extremely limited largely because of problems with regionalism (l42).s She
concludes, based on an institutional approach, that Ukraine can be described as a "protoparty system" that "is not conducive to further party.'system development" (150). Again,
nonconsolidation of the party system in the face of institutional reforms makes these
arguments unconvincing explanations as to why parties in Ukraine have not coalesced as they
have in the Baltic states or in Poland. Because the rejection of rationality-based explanations
has focused heavily on voter rationality, the problems resulting from overlooking
elite-motivator explanations become even more obvious when evidence of the impact of elite
actions is taken into consideration.
In the earlier literature, Matthew S. Shugart is alone in proposing a multifaceted
approach to party system evaluation. His chapter in Liberalization and Leninist Legacies,
edited by Beverly Crawford and Arend l.ijpharr (1997), describes how rational politicians
acting within transitional structures and institutions create the long-term institutions that
affect party systems (7.3-74). Shugart does not rule out culture as an important explanatoty
variable (74); however, he provides no in-depth discussion of such factors. Without a
discussion of what a cultutal approach can and cannot explain, an automatic reversion to
cultural explanations does not increase understanding of the democratic consolidation
process.
A radical shift away from the dominance of institutional approaches, which even
called into question the inviolability of Duverger's law, was effected by Gary W. Cox in
his 1997 book Making Votes Count." Cox makes an observation about DlIverger's law that
is particularly applicable to Ukraine. He cites a "powerful national executive" as a key
factor for institutionalizing political parties (182-93). In Ukraine, however, neither Leonid
Kravchllk nor Leonid Kuchma have found it necessary to formally affiliate with a political
party, thus presenting one possible explanation for Ukraine's weak party system. Krzysztof
Jasiewicz continued Sartori's and Cox's work in a 1992 article, "From Solidarity to Fragmentation." Jasiewicz studied party fragmentation in Poland that did not accord with the
expectations of an institutional approach.
Others who showed that perhaps an institutional methodology cannot "travel" to
Southern and Eastern Europe include Marko Bojcun (1995), who studied the 1994
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Ukrainian parliamemary elections, and Robert Moser, whose "The Impact of Parliamemary
Electoral Systems in Russia" (1997) looked at the discrepancy between what might be
expected under an institutional model and what was observed in the behavior of Russian
political parties.
The first to make a study of political party systems specific to Ukraine after the collapse
of the Soviet Union was Andrew Wilson (I 993).'" He considered three theoretical
approaches to understanding the weakness of the party system: strucrural "bottom-up,"
structural "top-down," and political culture approaches. Due to the fact that this study was
made ten years ago (before the Communist Party had recovered from irs ban) and that
Wilson draws no conclusion as to the relative value of these three approaches, another
look at the Ukrainian political system is merited."
Robert Moser's more recent article "Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in
Postcommunist States" (1999) provides rhe best evidence for questioning an instirutional
approach to srudying party systems in the new democracies of Eastern Europe. He
hypothesizes that the applicability of Duverger's law and other institutional paradigms
"will be mitigated by the [degreel of institutionalization of the party system" (360). Moser
makes his case using a quantitative analysis comparing party results in the two-tiered
parliaments of Russia, Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary. (Each of these country's parliaments includes members elected using a proportional-represemation system-the PR
tier-and members elected from single-member districts-the SMD tier.) Moser includes
Ukraine in the study, but only the 1994 parliamentary election before a proportional
representation system was introduced. Perhaps this is imended as a comrol variable; however, Moser offers no such explanation; and hence Ukraine figures only marginally imo his
comparison of tiers (see Moser's T.1ble 3).12 In light of Ukraine's importance among former
Soviet republics, it seems that this oversight could potentially cast doubt on Moser's conclusions, particularly as this leaves only Russia representing non-Baltic former Soviet states.
While Moser provides sufficient theolY and evidence to show that traditional institutional
explanations cannot be applied to consolidating democracies of the post-socialist world, he
offers no in-depth explanation of his new indepcndem variable-party institutionalization.
Instead he discusses causal factors afTecting party insrirurionaliLarion. all of which are
basically cui rural in nature. Essentially Moser has rejected the established instirutional
explanations and left nothing in their place except for a few sentences about cui rural elemems
of post-Soviet societies (373). This oversight is exacerbared by Moser's rejection of any elitemotivator explanations for mass or elite party behavior. Rationality in voting habits has
never been in favor, due to the major limitations on voter choice mentioned previously in
Birch's studies. The only reason to reject rationality in elire or party behavior-except as a
consequence of the impossibility of voter rationality-is Moser's quantitative evidence
about party fractionalization. In the case of Ukraine, it seems that Moser's conclusions
are based on an insufficient understanding of the data used in his study. This work will
attempt to evaluate whether Moser's conclusions about institutional explanations are
appropriate.
The work of Andrew Wilsoll, which has covered all of the parliamentaty and presidential
elections since Ukraine's independence (2002b), provides ample reason to conclude that
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Moser's inferences about the rationality of political actors ought to be questioned. His
study of the most recent presidential election (2002a) particularly shows that there is reason
to believe that eI ite-motivator factors are the most pertinent explanatOlY variables at the elite
level. This research aims to fill the gaps in Moser's data and analysis to add Ukraine to the
list of countries that do not follow the expectations outlined by an institutional approach
to party systems and also to support an explanation of the weak party system in Ukraine
based on elite-motivator explanations.

METHODOLOGY

The research is designed as a case study of four Ukrainian elections (three parliamentary
and one presidential), looking at various approaches of explaining the development of the
Ukrainian parliamentary system. The first part of the study evah\ates changes in indicators
of party fractionalization and consolidation during two parliamentary elections (1994 and
1998), held under different institutional arrangements. These two elections were chosen
because they represent two different institutional arrangements, thus allowing the opportunity for analyzing institutional factors with variance in the independent variable. Statistical
results and analysis have been provided in an attempt to bolster the quantitative research
previously done in the field. The measures of party fractionalization I will use include
an effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties (calculated, respectively, by comparing the proportion of the vote and proportion of parliamentary seats received by each
party)" and the least-squares index of disproportionality (calculated according to the
difference between the previous two measures).l4
The second half of the study is a qualitative analysis of three elections (the parliamentary
elections of 1998 and 2002 and the presidential election of 1999) with the purpose of
testing to what degree the rational actions of political elites (to further their own ends)
perpetuate the party fractionalization and nonconsolidation represented in the first half
of the study. The purpose of this parr of the study is to show that the elite-motivator
approach-considered independently, or as a more specific subset of cultural explanationscan be used as an alternative to the institutional descriptions that have proven insufficient
in explaining the development of political parties. These three elections were selected
because they are most recent and thus provide the most accurate picture of the current state
of party politics in Ukraine.
Several limitations will affect the conclusions presented by the research and will be
addressed. As a case study, the research is subject to the recurrent problems connected with
case studies and small-n size in general, along with problems of case selection. This
includes the possibility of lurking variables, as well as the fact that analysis over time is
difficult due to the short history of independence of Ukraine (twelve years). One significant
advantage of the choice of Ukrainian cases, however, is the benefits of comparing multiple
elections in a single country and the future possibilities of combining this case study with
others as part of a larger project with multiple case studies.
Although an attempt has been made to include statistical indicators, such data from two
parliamentary elections does not pretend to make this study quantitative. The research relies
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heavily on qualitative data and analysis-concrete conclusions from the research will have
limited explanatory value outside the area of focus. Without a larger sample size, including
cases from a variety of world regions, it is unclear the degree to which the conclusions
developed from this research should be applied to all post-socialist states, the Eastern European
region, or generally. Without comparing cases with more signifIcant variations in the status
of elite actors, more general conclusions cannot be drawn about the causal relationship of
elite-motivator explanations and party fragmentation. Additionally, it is impossible to
determine to what degree the status of elite actors in Ukraine is tied to cultural factors and
thus to what degree elite-motivator explanations ought to be distinguished from more general
cultural explanations. While a single case study is only a beginning, an in-depth study can
contribute with other studies to develop a more complete theoretical understanding of the
regIOn.

THE CAsE AGAINST AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH:
THE

1994 AND 1998

UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

In his 1994 study of electoral systems, Arend Lijpharr wrote that when a country undergoes a change in its electoral arrangements "many potentially important explanatory variables
can be controlled in the sense that they can be assumed not to differ or to differ only
marginally: the same country, the same political parries, the same voters, and so on" (78).
This potential is reduced in Ukraine, as it might be in any newly democratizing country,
in that the political system has been less stable than in an established democracy. This is
particularly true in regards to political parries, which have come and gone with regularity.
Nevertheless, the comparison of nyo Ukrainian parliamentary elections, under different
institutional arrangements (see Table 2), presents a unique opportunity to evaluate the
explanatory power oran institutional approach to understanding the Ukrainian parry system.
Table 2: Electoral Arrangements in Three Parliamentary Elections
Election

System Type

Single-Member Districts

1994

-rwo-round singlemember districts

450; two rounds, absolute
N/A
majority required in second
round

1998-

Mixed SMD/PR

225

present

Proportional
Representation Seat
Allocation

22,); party lists (distributed by Hare quota)

PR Threshold

N/A

4%

Source: Birch, Sarah, Frances Millard, Marina Popescu, and Kieran Williams. 2002. Embodying

democracy: Electoral system desigll ill post-Commullist Europe. New York: l'algrave Macmillan. 144.

One of the primary failures of the institutional approach in Eastern Europe is its
prediction that single-member district systems have fewer parties than proportional
representation systems. In former Soviet republics, single-member district seats have traditionally been associated with electoral unaccountability and a proliferation of parties.
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Therefore, "proportional representation [is] seen ... as the system most likely to generate
accountable majority government. ... Though this may seem strange to comparative students
of electoral systems, it made sense in the post-Soviet context, where party-list voting combined
with a relatively high threshold of representation worked as an engine of party consolidation"
(Birch 2002, 153). In Ukraine, as the electoral system moved away from single-member
districts towards a proportional representation scheme, the expectation would be that the
number of political parties would decrease; that is, parties would become less fractionalized,
and the parties would become more consolidated, because of the large number of unaffIliated
deputies elected from single-member districts. As this comparison will show, however,
institutional explanations are disappointingly ineffectual.

THE

1994 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

The first set of institutional arrangements under which Ukrainian elections were held (the
1994 election) were developed by a national legislan,1re that was elected before Ukraine
declared independence, "literally in a different country," as Birch put it (2002, 147). In the
years since independence, over three dozen political parties had developed; however "most
were little more than coteries of elites, with severely underdeveloped grassroots support
bases and little ideological distinctiveness" (147). Several factors played a role in the
development of the electoral retorm that would regulate the next set of parliamentary elections. Although elections were not scheduled to be held until 1995, parliament's legitimacy
was undercut by the hlCt that it was elected under the Soviet system. Additionally, the state of
the economy had continually worsened since the collapse of the U.S.S.R., leading to further
frustration with post-independence governance. Another factor that Birch notes as significant
was the reconstitution of the Communist Party (banned after the August Coup) and the
Russian parliamentary crisis of the previous year, which featured Yeltsin shelling a confrontational, left-dominated parliament into submission and calling for new elections
under a mixed PR-SMD system (146-47). All of these factors were important in the
process leading to electoral retorm.
The primary debate in the Verkhovna Rada about the proposal for electoral reform
centered around whether or not to introduce some element of a proportional representation
system, and if so, to what degree. In this dispute, the leftists-Socialists and newly
enfranchised Communists-unaffiliated deputies, and pro-presidential forces generally
opposed the establishment of a proportional representation element. They argued that the
country was not ready for this type of reform because Ukrainian parties were weak. Those
in favor of a mixed or entirely proportional system were the right and center-right parties.
Their argument was that a proportional representation system would help to strengthen
the parties and encourage the Rada to organize itself around parties.
A key element of the debate was the nominating procedures for candidates. This was
a question of the old local patronage systems versus the new, national or regional parties.
"The distinction between PR and the majoritarians was also viewed in terms of the
corruptibility of the latter. The right saw the single-member system as a means for the old
nomenklatura-the so-called 'party of power'-to maintain control of politics through
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their patronage networks .... A law which down played party affiliation had the added
advantage of allowing the 'party of power' to win seats without having to resort overtly to
a label designating a discredited ideology" (149). In the Soviet Union, nominations for
candidates had generally been made by workplace-based groups. If parties were to be effective
players in the legislature, they would have to be given at least the opportunity to nominate
candidates, if not complete control of the process.
In Shugart's study of party strength, he writes: "The concept of a strong party implies
a party that is capable of presenting a coherent face to the voters so that they can asses its
collective fitness for government ... Electoral laws atTecr ... how much authority is placed
in the hands of party leaders to determine the rank and file's electoral prospects." One of
his four indicators of party strength is whether or not the party controls who may run as a
member of the parry and in what order they are elected (1997, 44-45). In the end, the
left-wing forces saw allowing parties to nominate candidates (as well as continuing the traditional methods) and indicating the party affiliation of single-member district candidates'
on the ballot as sufficient steps to promote party consolidation (Birch 2002, 149). As
discussed previously, in the process of democratic consolidation, the role of party consolidation has been shown to be important, ·especially in countries without a tradition of
strong civil society.
Four plans were put to a vote in the Rada: a pure single-member district version, a 350
SMDIlOO PR version, a 50-50 mixed version, and a pure proportional representation version.
Although Communist and Socialist leaders had demonstrated willingness to compromise,
even to the point of allowing the 50-50 version, the pure single-member district version
received a majority of votes, with the 50-50 and pure proportional-representation versions receiving less than a third as many votes. With the scheduled elections just over four
months away, the subsequent drafting was rushed and, as a result, some unintentional
elements wound up in the final draft. First, an absolute majority, not just a plurality, was
required for victory in the second round of voting." Second, the incredibly diftlcult process
for candidate nominations by parties is most probably explained by the fact that those
requiremems were originally intended to apply to party lists in a mixed or proportional
represelllation system (Birch 2002, 150-51). Whereas any ten voters could consti[Ute a
group to nominate a candidate, and there were no requirements for workers' collectives
to nominate a candidate, party regional conferences (the only forum in which parties
could nominate candidates) had to be attended by 50 delegates or two-thirds of local party
members (Birch 2000, 82).
The results of these apparent mistakes were disastrous. Out of the 450 districts, only
49 were able to meet the strict majority requirements, and the successive election the next
month produced only 289 more, meaning that by the opening of the parliament, only
about three-quarters of the seats had been filled. Elections to till the remaining seats
continued well into 1996 (nearly two years later), umil a moratorium on elections was
passed to give a weary electorate a respite. The effects of the overly burdensome requirements
for candidates to be nominated by parties meam that only about ten percent of candidates
were nominated by parries, compared with over sixty percent by citizen groups and about
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a quarrer by workers' collectives (Birch 2000, 82), Over half of the deputies elected were
unaffiliated, although all but twenty joined various parries once the session began
(Harasymiw 2002,258-59). 'The most striking difference berween the candidate corpuses
of 1990 and 1994 was the overall decline in political identification .... Candidates ...
were far less likely to be party-aHiliatd" (Birch 2000, 89).'"
The effect on party consolidation-so important in democratic consolidation-was
apparent (see '[able 3). "The Soviet-era majoritarian system was left largely unchanged, and
those alterations that were made proved detrimental to the development of organized
multi-party competition" (82). The legislation "undeniably hindered the development of
cohesive political parries" (Birch 2002, 151). These effects continued to be observed long
after the convocation of parliament began. By 1996, the nine party groups that existed in
1994 had become rwelve and the number of unaHiliated deputies had almost doubled. The
Agrarian Party, Interregional bloc, and the Unity Party all suffered splits. At the end of the
parliamentary convocation in 1998, there were once again nine parry blocs-different,
however, from the original nine-and the caucus of the unaHiliated had doubled yet again
(Harasymiw 2002,268).
Table 3: Measures of Party Fractionalization, 1994 Election

IPR Tier

ISMD Tzer

Case

Effective
Number of
Eletoral
Parties

Effccti\'e
,,"umber of
Parliamentary
Parties

Least-Squares Index Effective
of
Number of
I )isproportionality Electoral
Parties

1994

N/A

0!/A

N/A

2.1681

Effective
Least-Squares Index
Number of
of
Parliamentary Disproportionality
Parties

1.4691

0.2907

1998

THE

1998

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

The badly needed changes to the 1994 electoral law were delayed until just two months
before the subsequent parliamentary elections in I 998-four years later. Parliament in the
interim had been preoccupied with passing the country's first constitution in the era of
independence. "The new constitution effectively entrenched the institutional status quo,
but its adoption ended years of jockeying for power and wrangling over the design of the
state" and allowed parliament to redirect its attention to electoral reform (Birch 2000, 102,
104). During this period, the same problems that had plagued the previous convocation continued: parliamentary flCtions appeared and disappeared, but the quagmire of the center
remained muddled. "Factions formed, dissolved, and reformed to such an extent that by
1998 the political structure of the assembly bore only a vague resemblance to the party
aHiliations of the deputies elected four years earlier.... The region between [the Communist
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and Rukh strongholds] was one of continued flux as aspirant leaders strove to attract followings from among the weakly-aligned centrist mass of the parliament" (102).
Birch outlines several factors that led to broad support for reform. Some parties, such as
the Socialist and Rural parties had both failed to meet expectations in the 1994 election; other
parties, such as the Communists, taking their cue from the 1993 Russian elections, saw the
potential windfall that the introduction of a proportional-representation element might
bring. The left-wing parties also realized that, as institutions, they had more in common with
the institutionalized parties of the right than the unaffiliated deputies (2002, 153).
Furthermore, there was general recognition that the large number of parties and unaffiliated deputies made parliament ineffective. The situation was exacerbated by Kuchma's
hostility towards parliament, which added a sense of urgency for parliament to become
a decisive body. Kuchma's relationship with parliament is characterized at its extreme by
the parliament's attempt early in 1999 to abolish the presidency and by Kuchma's second
inaugaration in 1999, which he decided to hold in a concert hall rather than in parliament.
As a result, nearly 160 deputies did not attend, as a sign of protest (Harasymiw 2002,

291,294).
In addition to the obvious changes to the electoral system that nearly all agreed needed
to be made after the interminable by-elections that resulted from the previous electoral system in 1994, there was also a feeling action should be taken to strengthen the party
system so that parliament would operate in a more effective manner. The general consensus
was in favor of a mixed system such as had been used in Russia in 1993 and 1995. The primary points of disputation were whether some lesser type of turnout requirement should be
retained, what percentage of the seats should be elected by proportional representation, and
how high the threshold for parties should be in a proportional-representation system.
Early on in the process, five proposals were considered by parliament. There were three
bills similar to the draft presented by a working committee of the Legal Policy and Judicial
Reform Committee, which proposed that half of the seats be elected from a national
proportional-representation list with a three percent threshold. The other proposal was for
a pure proportional-representation system, also with a three percent threshold. Proponents of
proportional representation maintained that single-member district seats were too easily
bought, while their opponents claimed it would not be any more difficult to buy an entire
national list. One of the alrernate versions of the working group's proposal received the
most votes, and a compromise with broad support was worked out with only one major
revision: a four percent threshold. This bill passed with little opposition in March of 1997
(Birch 2002,155-56).
Backing for the proposal, however, quickly disappeared as presidential supporters
instigated active opposition. Kuchma was "wary of increased party organization by either
his left-wing or his right-wing rivals. He therefore opposed a proportional law, especially
one with a threshold that would exclude his centrist allies and magnify the seat share of the
large parties" (154). The better organized parties also threatened to withdraw support, as
they naturally favored a higher threshold level. Some members of smaller parties, centrists,
and unaffiliated deputies continued to favor a purely single-member district arrangement.
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These members' position intensified when they realized that a proportional-representation
system with a low threshold would not pass.
This led to the bill's failure in nine successive votes, the introduction of two alternate
proposals by presidential supporters, and finally by a presidential veto with a proposal for
fifteen amendments when the bill finally did pass. After parliament accepted twelve of the
president's proposed amendments, Kuchma finally acquiesced and signed the bill on October 22. This was not the end of obstacles to electoral reform, though. In February of 1998,
with the parliamentary campaign already well underway, the Constitutional Court "delivered
a scathing ruling, declaring the law was unconstitutional on more than forty counts." The
Court ruled, however, that because it was so late in the process, the elections could proceed
under the law (I '56-57).
In Birch's analysis of the new law, she notes several important advantages. "The law
provided an incentive for political entrepreneurs ro form parties, .rather than relying on the
local fidaoms to gain scats .... At the same time it recognized the geographical heterogeneity
of Ukrainian politics by allowing political organizations with concentrated regional support
the opportunity to win seats locally without having to demonstrate national strength."
Birch also notes, however, that the introduction of a proportional representation element
with a relatively low threshold encouraged a number of new parties to form. Seventeen
new parries formed between the 1994 and 1998 elections, and ten formed just in the year
preceding the 1998 election (2000, 104).
In hindsight, the adoption of a four percent threshold rather than the five-percent level
more standard in proportional-representation systems may have been fortuitous. Of the
eight parties that cleared the four-percent threshold, four received less than five percent of
the proportional representation vote. Three of these four were centrist parties, meaning
that a five-percent threshold would have left two parties on the left (CPU and Socialists),
one on the right (National Democrats), and only one centrist party (Social Democrats) to
represent the political spectrum. As Wilson and Birch write, "the elections came within a
whisker of producing an artificially polarized assembly" (1999, 1041). D'Anieri, Kravchuk,
and Kuzio, however, disagree. They cite the four-percent threshold as one of the new
electoral law's weaknesses that undermine the consolidation of parties because of a low
incentive for parties to combine in order to pass the threshold requirement (I999, 156).
The effect of introducing a proportional-representation element into the electoral system
appears to be small. In qualitative terms, parties were no more consolidated than under the
previous arrangements. In parliament, "factions formed, dissolved, and reformed to such an
extent that by 1998 the political structure of the assembly bore only a vague resemblance to
the parry affiliations of the deputies elected four years earlier" (Birch 2000, 102). The failure
of right-wing parties to consolidate is evidenced by their poor showing in the
proportional-representation list. After the deputies were seated, the lack of consolidation
was manifest by the fact that it took nineteen rounds to elect a speaker (105, 107). In
quantitative terms as well, the lack of change is clear (see Table 4). The effective number
of electoral parties was essentially unchanged, while the single-member districts tier experienced an increase in electoral parties, contrary to expectations. Least-squares measures of
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disproportionality, difficult to calculate due to the large number of independents, also
showed little difference.
The results of institutional change in electoral arrangements, specifIcally the introduction
of a proportional-representation element, demonstrate the weakness of the institutional
approach to studying Ukrainian political party development. Traditional expectations that
proportional-representation would increase the number of parties do nor hold-as we
would predict based on other post-socialist countries. The alternate expectation (under an
institutional paradigm) that such electoral reform would produce party consolidation also
does not hold. Having demonstrated the inability of institutional explanations to describe
these developments in the Ukrainian parliamentary system, we now turn to an e1itemotivator paradigm for further explanation.
Table 4: Measures of Parry Fractionalization, 1998 Election
SMD Tier

PR Tier
Case

Effective
Numher of
Electoral
Partics

1994 N/A
1998

10.7473

Effective
Numher of
Parliamentary
Partics

least-Squares Index Effective
of
Number of
I)isproportionaliry Electoral
Parries

Effective

N/A

N/A

L1681

1.4691

0,2907

4,9549

0.2907

2, 9896

3,2;'96

0,0271

I,cast-Squares

Number of
Index of
Parliamentary f) isp "'p') rrin n al iry
Parric\

THE CASE FOR AN ELITE-MOTIVATOR APPROACH:
THREE ELECTIOl'lS UNDER KUCHMA

(1998, 1999,2002)

The problems with the Ukrainian system of political parties can be described in two general
categories: first, a lack of parry consolidation important in the process of democratic
consolidation and, second, continued party fractionalization. The data previously introduced
provides ample evidence for fractionalization, while much has been written qualitatively
about the nonconsolidated nature of Ukrainian political parties. It is sufficient here to
mention the problems outlined in the brief overview of political parties presented earlier:
the illegitimacy of the left, the electoral weakness of the right, and the resulting incoherence
in the center. Due to the illegitimate left and the weak right, the center parties are essentially
guaranteed the leading role in government. "The Ukrainian centre 'parties' have therefore
governed by default and their long free ride has not been good for Ukraine" (Wilson
2002b,206).
Stagnation, corruption, and abuse of power are three major problems engendered by
such a situation. Examples of these three woes include the stagnation of political and
economic reforms by oligarchs seeking to preserve a status quo beneficial to themselves;
corruption in the political process by centrist party members who are not forced to court
the public in the fair and open forum of a democratic market of ideas; abuse of power by
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incumbents to preserve the illegitimacy of the left and the electoral weakness of the right.
So long as this situation continues it will be difficult for true reformist-liberals or centrist
parties-those that will promote the democratic consolidation of Ukraine-to be successful
in Ukrainian politics.
While others have concluded that voters and elites alike suHer from a lack of rational
behavior-based on evidence that institutional factors cannot adequately explain these
observed problems-a closer look at the machinations of the political elite will show that
the status quo is intentionally, and rationally, preserved for the benefit of those incumbents
in power. Three elections will illustrate these points: the 1999 presidential election provides
an example of elite behavior that promotes nonconsolidation, while the 1998 and 2002
parliamentary elections offer evidence that elite actors deliberately promote party fractionalization to achieve their own ends. 80th of these results, in turn, negatively impact the
course of Ukrainian democratic consolidation.
Those in the center and on the right have prolonged the unreformed state of the left
because they find it beneficial as a campaign issue. They have perpetuated the distrust of
leftists as legitimate partners in government, and this is one of the major obstacles to the
consolidation of a party sy5t(:m in Ukraine. This is especially true in comparison with other
post-socialist countries where the former Communist Party has transformed itself into a
viable political movement. Centrists and rightists know that as long as they can continue
the present situation they are guaranteed at least one issue on which they can run. "The
centre has even come to prefer the maintenance of a left-wing bogey to keep the range of
governing options narrow and disguise their own lack of will for real reform" (Wilson
2002b, 206).'

THE

1999 PRESIDENTIAL El.ECTION

The "red-scare" tactic was especially obvious 111 Kuchma's 1999 re-election campaign.
"Kuchma obviously preferred to face a real ogre on the left. ... Both Vitrenko [of the
ultra-leftist Progressive Socialist Party] and Symonenko, leader of the Communists, were
discretely supported as alternatives to the potentially more [electable and thus] threatening
'Ukrainian Kwasniewski,' Oleksamlr Moroz .... The left had to be kept in its ghetto. Any
potential breakout to the center had to be headed oW' (200). It was even reported that the
Kuchma campaign was responsible for a grenade attack against Vitrenko and the subsequent blame for the attack heaped on Moroz's supporters. "The media [controlled by the
President and his supporters] seemed to favor Vitrenko over Moroz [and] observers, both
journalistic and official . . . were of one opinion about the campaign-it was dirty"
(Harasymiw 2002, 323). As Bohdan Harasymiw wrote, "Whom or what did Kuchma
represent? In short. as the campaign revealed, it was power, and the political parties fragmentation worked in his favour" (323).
The sinister nature of these tactics was exacerbated by incumbent spending power and
absolute control of the mass media. "During the campaign the government-controlled
mass media were grossly one-sided in favour of Kuchma. The taxation authorities and
other police harassed the independent media outlets" (323). The anti-party tactics were
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apparent as early as the 1994 presidential campaign (see note 1 1) and were again evident
in the 2002 parliamentary elections. In 2002, Vitrenko was resurrected "after her cameo
performance in the presidential election ... [and] was once again omnipresent-this time
with only few of her own advertisements but with plenty of talking-head time on official
television" (Wilson 2002a, 96). This final example shows that the tactics of preserving the
nonconsolidation of the left spilled over from the 1999 elections to the 2002 elections. From
a consideration of presidential campaigns, we now turn to a discussion of parliamentary
elections. If the 1999 presidential elections are a perfect example of elite behavior maintaining party nonconsolidation, the 2002 parliamentary elections show how the same
actors used the same tactics to extend party fractionalization, once again intentionally and
rationally, in order to achieve their own ends.

THE

1998

AND

2002

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Like the promotion of nonconsolidation, maneuvers to prolong party fractionalization,
although perfected in the 2002 elections, actually began earlier. Such tactics had first been
employed four years earlier in the 1998 parliamentary elections. In 1998, however, only
"clones" had been used ("clones," Wilson's term, were parties designed to steal votes that
would reduce opponents' shares of parliamentary seats; Wilson and Birch at that time
rderred to them as "spoiler" parties)-not "satellites" (parties designed to capture seats that
could then be added to the presidential coalition), and they had been employed only
against the left (see Table 5). The Agrarian Party was created to challenge the Village party
in rural areas; two different parties, one labor-based and one with a nostalgic appeal, were
set up to take on the Communist Party; and, a division was engineered in the Socialist Party
to create the Progressive Socialist Party, which was rumored to be receiving direct aid from
pro-presidential forces, in spite of the tact that its members continued caucllsing with
the left. Indeed, the success of the "spoilers" in 1998 may have been even greater than that
of the "clones" four years later (Wilson and Birch 1999, 1041, 104.1).
Table 5: 1998 Parliamentary Election Spoiler Parties
Spoiler Party

"Spoiling" from

% ofPR vote

Agrarian Parry

Village Parry

3.6R%

Working Ukraine

Communist Parry of Ukraine (trade unions)

3.06%

Parry of Defenders of the Fatherland

Communist Party of Ukraine (veterans)

O.Jl')'o

Progressive Socialist Parry

Socialist Party

4.05%

Source: Wilson, Andrew, and Sarah Birch. 1999. Voting stability, political gridlock:
Ukraine's 1998 parliamentary elections. Europe-Asia Studies 51 (September):
1039-68.
In 2002, while mainta1l1111g nonconsolidation was the presidential team's prderred
tactic for dealing with the left, engineering fractionalization was their modus operandi for
opponents on the right. Rukh (Ukrainian for "movement"), the main opposition group
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during the Soviet era, was subject to crippling disunity early on in the period of independence. At their third congress, the first after Ukrainian independence, the movement broke
into three factions and has remained more or less divided ever since. IH Additionally, a number
of ultra-nationalist (right-wing) parties sprang up in western Ukraine, further weakening
Rukh (Wilson 2002b, 178-79). Just as they had during the presidential election of 1994,
the right quickly sold their support to the incumbent based on his record of Ukrainian
state-building (their primary concern), but just to be safe Kuchmas reelection campaign
organized one more split of Rukll to ensure that the president would have no competition
on his right (200).
The party-splitting practiced in the 1999 presidential elections gave way to even more
advanced techniques of promoting party fractionalization in the 2002 parliamentary elections.
\V'ilson's analysis of the president's campaign ourlines a three-pronged plan to bolster
Kuchma's influence in parliament. The first part of the plan proposed creating a Ukrainian
version of the Russian Yedinsrvo Party that had enjoyed parliamentary success in the Russian
Duma elections earlier that year. The second parr of the plan, however, was the creation of
a number of "satellite" and "clone" parties. They were designed to mimic other parties and
steal votes from them; in the case of the "satellites," in order to capture seats that could
then be added to the presidential coalition modeled on Yedinstvo; in the case of "clones,"
votes that would reduce opponents' shares of parliamentary seats.
In the 2002 election "at least a dozen of the 33 parties and party blocs running in the
elections were artificial projects with opaque sponsorship and nefarious purposes .... All
such parties, however, were virtual in the sense of being nothing more than brands or fronts
and vehicles for [other] issues" (Wilson 2002a, 94). (See tables 6 and 7). By merely increasing the number of parties in the campaign artificially, the actions of the president's interests increased party fractionalization. Wilson gives two types of evidence of the "front"
nature of these parties. First, by analyzing the party lists, supporters of the president and
their business associates appear in parties incongruous to the individuals' identities-such
as men in the Women for the Future Party, the aged in the youth-oriented New Generation
Party, and executives from highly polluting industrial sectors in the Green Party. Second,
all the "satellite" parties spent vast amounts on television campaigns (some even more than
the president's own coalition and the chief opposition party, "Our Ukraine") that were
developed by expensive Russian public relations firms. These parties were also given
inordinate exposure in the state-controlled media and by television stations owned by
presidential supp~rters (94-95).
Table 6: 2002 Parliamentary Election Satellite Parties
Satellite Parties

% ofPR vote

\VOl11el1 for the Future

2.11%

\Vinter Crop

2.01%

Green Party

1..3%
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Table 7: 2002 Parliamentary Election Clone Parties
Clone Parties

"Cloned" from

% ofPR vote

Vitrenko Bloc

Ultra-left

.3.22%

Communist Party of\1(1orkers and Peasants

Communist Party of Ukraine (left tacrion)

0.41%

Communist Parry of Ukraine (renewed)

Communist Parry of Ukraine (right bcion)

1.4%

Bloc of the People's Movement of Ukraine

Our Ukraine

0.16%

Yabluko

Center/Ref(lrmists

1.15%

New Generation

Center/Reformists

0.77%

Source: Wilson. Andrew. 2002b. Ukraine's 2002 eleerions: i.e'S fraud, more virruality. Em Furopean
Cowtitutional Review II (summer): <)6.

In the end, however, only half of this part of the plan was successful. The "clone" parties
succeeded in drawing votes from Our Ukraine, the Socialists, the Communists, and others,
but the "satellites" failed simply because there were too many of them, and they crowded each
other out of the fteld. Unlike the Progressive Socialist Parry that met the threshold requirement in 1998, none of the "satellite" parties in 2002 broke the four-percent requirement
to win seats in the Verkhovna Rada.
Reviewing elite actions in these three elections demonstrates the great adverse impact
that Ukrainian elites have had on parry system development and parry consolidation. That
these actions were undertaken for personal political gain should be clear, and eliminate
questions about the rationality of elite actors. Considering the effect of these actors,
political scientists studying Ukraine or other post-socialist cases ought not to ignore
rational choice factors, particularly elite-motivator factors, any longer in analyses of parry
systems.
CONCLUSIONS

Ukraine, as one of the most important former Soviet republics, one of the most Westernoriented, and one of the most strategically important to the West, is an important beginning
point for studies of democratization in the post-socialist world. Parry consolidation, an
important factor in any course of democratic transition, is even more salient in former
Soviet states that lack a historical tradition of civil sociery. In these countries political parties
are practically the only method for mass expression of political preference. Developing a
theoretical understanding of how political parry systems consolidate, or fail to do so, is
clearly importam to understanding democratization in Eastern Europe.
This study has shown that Ukraine, like other post-socialist coumries of Eastern
Europe, fails to meet the expectations of an institutional approach to studies of parry systems.
Considering the importance of Ukraine as a post-socialist case, and the fact that previous
studies had failed to adequately consider Ukraine, this should be seen as a significant
finding. In the place of an institutional paradigm, evidence presented here has demonstrated
the salience of elite-motivator explanations for parry system development. Elite actors
intentional behave in such a way that prolongs party fractionalization and prevents
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parry consolidation. This is not symptomatic of a lack of rationality on the parr of political
actors, as has been suggested, but is done for political self-benefit and thus is likely to
continue so long as other factors allow it to. This ought to ptovide justifIcation for scholars
to give greater consideration to elite-motivator paradigms when attempting to identity
the causes of parry development in post-socialist countries. Furrher study of such cases is
necessary to determine with more precision the degree to which elite actors truly affect
party development, and also to determine to what extent this is or is not a function of culture.
This has significant implications for outlooks on the process of democratic consolidation in Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Because of the historical lack of civil
society in former socialist states, a lack of party development should be considered an
important requirement for the continuation of this process. Institutional changes appear
unlikely to generate considerahle improvement in the current situation. This means that
until the circumstances that permit political elites to unduly influence party fractionalization are eliminated or at least curtailed, further democratic consolidation in Ukraine
appears tenuous at best.
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ENDNOTES

1. Russian-language news oudets ill Russia reacted with great surprise, almost outrage, to
such discussions.
2. Harasymiw noted in a study of party discipline that centrist deputies were even more
undisciplined (27.1) than the officially unafllliated (22.1), who, he notes, "had
absolutely no reason to show callCllS solidarity." Interestingly, three other factions were
also less disciplined than the unaffiliated (2002, 269, 271).
3. Officially, the president is not affiliated with any party, although United Ukraine is
explicitly a pro-presidential party.
4. Although the "Yulia 'l)'moshenko Bloc" received 7.3 percent of thd'R vote (equating
to 22 seats), it is unclear whether this group, more personality-based than most, ought
to be considered a "main" party.
5. "PR" refers the proportional-representation system introduced after legislative reform.
"SMD" refers to single-member district seats, of which the original parliament was fully
comprised and which was retained in part after the reforms; 85 seats in SMD's went to
independents, members of parties receiving less than 1 percent of the PR vote or that had
results that were disputed. An addition:U 11 seats were unaccounted for by the Central
Election Commission. Source: Ukrainian Central Election Comission. 2002 regular
election results. At <http://l95.230.157.53/pls/vd2002/webprocOv>. 10 Nov. 2003.
6. The parties of the right with enough support to win parliamentary seats all joined
centrist party blocs for the 2002 election.
7. Harasymiw makes the following observations: "Parliament even issued an appeal to the
Ukrainian people in October [1999], urging them not to vote during the presidential
election for the incumbent Leonid Kuchma in order to ensure democracy. The president,
for his part, was not above showing his disdain for Parliament by deciding, most importantly, to conduct his second inauguration on 30 November in a concert hall rather than
in the Parliament building. In protest, about 160 deputies-Communists and other leftists-refused to attend." After a short-lived pro-presidential majority, "several weeks of
turmoil followed. Both Deputy Speaker Martyniuk and Speaker Tkachenko were outsted, but Tkachenko refused to step down. The majority then adjourned to another place
and on 1 I;ebruary it elected Ivan Pliushch as speaker and Stepan Havrysh as deputy
speaker. For about a week the two groups held parallel sittings, with the leftist minority
physically occupying the parliamentary hall proper" (2002, 291, 294).
8. For example, some major parties do not compete in certain regions, particularly western
Ukraine, which is a stronghold of the right. This limits voter choice and creates implications for the rationality of voters.
9. Earlier, Giovanni Sartori, in Grofman and Lijphart's Hectoral Laws and Their Political
Consequences (1986), laid background for such doubt about the explanatory power of
insti tu tio lIal ism.
10. Although Wilson's article was written ten years ago, his description of the overall party
system is still accurate-it was provided earlier at the end of the section on the important role of parties in democratic consolidation.
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II. Wilson states, for example, that only Rukh movements had established offices in Kiev
and respectable publishing arms. The author, however, has visited the substantial Communist Parry headquarters in Kiev and is personally familiar with the many offerings
from their presses.
12. Moser states in a footnote (46) that data was not available from the 1998 election, the
second election case srudied in this research. Sufficient data to calculate all of Moser's
statistics, with the exception of effective number of candidates, is now available for
both the 1998 and 2002 parliamentary elections.
13. rollowing Moser's methodology: 'The effective number of parties index is calculated
by squaring the proportion of the vote or seat shares of each parry, adding these
together, then dividing I by this total: N [sub v]=I/I(v [sub 1]1) or N [sub v]=1/I(s
[sub i]?)" (Moser 1999, fn. 32).
14. Again, Moser's methodology: "The least-squared index of disproportionaliry is calculated by squaring the vote-seat share differences and adding them together; this total
is divided by 2; and then the square root of this value is taken: LSq= [SqRt of? I(v
[sub iJ ~s [sub i])?" (Moser 1999, fn. 33).
15. The requirement that a candidate receive an absolute majority in order to be elected
was exacerbated by the habit of some Ukrainians to vote against all candidates as a
protest. In a close race, even a few such voters could prevent either candidate from
receiving fifty percent of the vote (Birch 2000, 82~83).
16. An article in Foreign Policy in 1995 claimed that these problems were premeditated
actions by President Leonid Kravchuk against the development of political parries.
According to Anders Aslund, Kravchuk "tried to cancel the elections, and for a long
time it was unclear whether they would take place .... Finally, Kravchuk settled for a
very complicated electoral system with no role for political parties and low campaignspending ceilings .... His declared hope was that less than 50 percent of Ukrainian
voters would participate in the parliamentary elections, thus rendering them invalid
and leaving Ukraine with an elected president bur no parliament" (130). This provides
a precursor of the anti-parry actions of the elites that will be discussed.
17. One of the most destructive influences of the unreformed left has been opposition to
economic reforms, which others-·including the President-have used for their own
ends. By using the leftist vote, business interests aligned with the president were able
to hold up reforms in the Verkhovna Rada that were not beneficial to their own
interests. Kuchma's allies also relied upon Communist votes to remove Yushchenko in
a vote of no confidence in order to subdue a possible opponent of the president (Wilson 2002b, 329). D'Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio wrote: "[The amorphous center] also
works to strengthen the executive at the Rada's expense, as the president can often tailor draft legislation presented to the Rada for approval in such a way as to win the support of the center (his natural supporters) in alliance usually with the right or,
occasionally, with the left" (1999,160).
18. In 200 I ~2002, former Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko's managed to unite at least
some of [he rival Rukh factions in his "Our Ukraine" bloc of parties.
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